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JUSTICE WITHOUT JUSTICES 
John 0. McGinnis* 
My proposal for constitutional erasure is simply to eliminate 
the position of Supreme Court Justice. This notion is not as 
radical as it initially sounds. It would not stamp out judicial re-
view, the supremacy of federal law, or even the Supreme Court 
itself. If the separate office of Supreme Court Justice had not 
been established, federal judges sitting on the inferior courts of 
the United States could have been randomly assigned to the Su-
preme Court for short periods, such as six months or a year. In 
the early republic, Supreme Court Justices themselves sat on 
designated lower courts when they "rode circuit." Call my coun-
terfactual universe "Supreme Court riding." 
For now, assume that this universe would require an altera-
tion of the Constitution, rather than a mere revision of jurisdic-
tional statutes, though I will return briefly to that interesting is-
sue below. Whatever means would be necessary to carry it out, 
my proposal would efface a key provision of our received consti-
tutional order. Why do it? I believe that judges should treat all 
written law, including the Constitution, as a formal system of 
rules to be objectively interpreted according to their original 
meaning. Supreme Court Justices have too often proved inca-
pable of engaging in this enterprise. The most disastrous deci-
sions in the constitutional history of the United States-such as 
Dred Scott/ Plessy,2 and Roe v. Wade3 -have this in common: the 
Justices employed a style of decision making that had more in 
common with formulating a political platform or policy position 
paper than with interpreting a legal text understood as a system 
of rules. 
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I. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
3. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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The nature of the office itself has made such lapses almost 
inevitable. Vested for life with the awesome power to make fi-
nal decisions with wide-ranging consequences for the nation, Su-
preme Court Justices generally cannot help but come to see 
themselves as statesmen rather than as humble arbitrators of le-
gal disputes. Indeed, many of the mortals who have inhabited 
the marble temple across from the Capitol have come to believe 
that they have an even higher calling: to serve as priests of our 
collective conscience and to preserve the nation's "very ability to 
see itself though its constitutional ideals."4 
In contrast, judges who "rode" to the Supreme Court only 
for a short time would have been more likely to treat constitu-
tional issues and other momentous decisions more like the other 
quotidian matters that they were accustomed to resolving in 
their courts. Supreme Court riding would have lessened Jus-
tices' vested interest in the development of constitutional law ac-
cording to some personal vision because they would have re-
turned to their home courts to dine on a diet of mundane 
commercial and criminal matters, as well as constitutional issues 
for which they were not the final arbiters. The prospect of soon 
returning to a professional life occupied with discovery disputes 
and trials of accused drug dealers functions like the whisper of 
the slave in the back of the triumphal chariot, who reminded the 
Roman general of his mortal fallibility. Today's newspapers, 
like the throngs of cheering Romans, perform the opposite role 
by encouraging judges to overstep the law. The short term of 
Supreme Court riders would make it easier to resist the urgings 
of the Washington Post and New York Times to "grow in office." 
Thus, the structure of the office of Supreme Court riders would 
have been more likely to instill the habits of constrained judg-
ment contemplated by Federalist 78.5 
Supreme Court riding would also have had other good ef-
fects. It would have made the Court a less imperial (and imperi-
ous) presence in national life. Long ago, our own American 
Brutus correctly predicted that the Supreme Court would con-
solidate power in the central government because the Justices 
would have an interest in using interpretation to expand their 
own powers and those of the government to which they be-
4. Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. S33, 86..'l 
(I 992). 
5. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Ointon Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 464,465 
(Mentor, 1961) (Courts should have "'neither force nor will but merely judgment"). 
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longed.6 Supreme Court riders, however, would not have been 
long time residents of the nation's federal district and would thus 
be more likely to retain a respect for the nation's constituent 
states. The structure of the office would thus have militated 
against the unjustifiable nationalizing tendencies that have often 
marred the Court's jurisprudence. 
A related benefit is that Supreme Court riders would have 
not spent their lives in one of the world's most artificial cities-a 
locale where the principal business is minding other people's 
business. Simply by living in cities with a greater multiplicity of 
enterprises and concerns, Supreme Court riders would at the 
margin have been more sympathetic to market processes and 
civil society.7 Thus, the elimination of the position of Supreme 
Court Justice would have tempered one great tension inherent in 
our original constitutional order: a Constitution dedicated to 
preserving private and decentralized ordering has unfortunately 
depended for its preservation on the decisions of governmental 
actors employed by a centralized authority. 
My counterfactual universe would have combined the ad-
vantages of term limits with those of life tenure. Federal judges 
would have continued to enjoy the independence afforded by 
life tenure because they would have returned to their home 
courts, whatever decisions they made while on loan to the Su-
preme Court. But the sharp limits on their terms of supreme de-
cision making would have improved some pathologies associated 
with life tenure on the Supreme Court. It would have encour-
aged a circulation of jurists with fresh perspectives on legal is-
sues and prevented the law from becoming the personal domain 
of a few. It would also have curtailed the effects of senility and 
the excessive delegation of power to young and energetic law 
clerks by reducing the temptation to cling to the bench into very 
old age. 
The most important risk from term limits, in general, is that 
an office holder will perform less responsibly to make a name for 
himself in the short time available. While some jurists might 
have used their short-time on the high court to seek fifteen min-
6. Brutus XI, reprinted in John P. Kaminskin and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds., 15 
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 516-17 (State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, 1984 ). 
7. For similar reasons Professor Steven Calabresi has suggested that the Supreme 
Court be moved to a location outside Washington. See Relimiting Congressional Power: 
Should Congress Play a Role?, 12 L. & Pol. Rev. 627, 636 (1997) (remarks of Steven 
Calabresi). 
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utes of fame, I believe the risk from this would have been small. 
New Justices have typically behaved for their first few years 
much as they did as lower court judges.8 It seems to take a while 
to make the transition from a servant of the law to its master. 
Some may argue that Supreme Court riding would have de-
stabilized the Court, weakening the force of precedent and con-
sequently the public's respect for its judgments. This critique 
might have some force if we were to compare a court composed 
of Supreme Court riders with one composed of judicial para-
gons. But the notion has little force if we compare my imagined 
court with what has actually existed. That Supreme Court has 
frequently overruled important decisions, often within a short 
period, both with and without decisive changes in personnel.9 
The Court has even included Justices who stubbornly refused to 
uphold the death penalty despite scores of contrary decisions by 
their brethren. 10 Some Justices have candidly admitted that stare 
decisis is simply a doctrine of convenience.11 Others praise stare 
decisis, but in important cases give it no effect.12 
When was the last time any Justice was publicly praised for 
a career marked by fidelity to precedent, or criticized as a judi-
cial innovator? Supreme Court Justices by virtue of their long 
tenure can often move the law dramatically to their way of 
thinking, and serious concern for precedent interferes with the 
exercise of that power. In contrast, Supreme Court riders would 
have been less able to instantiate their political vision and would 
therefore be more likely to follow precedent. Moreover, be-
cause the riders would have come from inferior courts, which 
operate under the threat of reversal, they would have had more 
practice in following precedent. Lower court judges are fre-
quently praised in testimonials and memorials for being infre-
quently reversed. The raw power that was briefly theirs while 
riding to the Supreme Court would seldom have had much affect 
8. Of course, some individual lower court judges have always rendered outlandish 
judgments, but they would have had less ability to affect the decisions of nine-member 
court than their own trial court or a panel of three. 
9. The most notorious example is Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 
U.S. 528 (1985), which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), 
which itself overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). 
10. See Clifton S. Elgarten, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 19 Cardozo 
L. Rev. 817, 817-19 (1997) (praising the refusal of Justices Brennan and Marshall to ac-
cede to stare decisis in the death penalty). 
II. See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 401,403 (1988). 
12. See William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735 (1949). 
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on their overall reputation, except perhaps negatively if they 
seemed to get carried away with themselves while on the Su-
preme Court. 
Another possible objection is that Supreme Court riders 
would have been less capable jurists than Supreme Court Jus-
tices. This objection seems to have force only if we assume what 
I deny: that the Supreme Court should be an arena for statesmen 
or demi-gods. The variation in legal ability that now exists 
within the federal judiciary is relatively small, perhaps smaller 
than what exists within the Supreme Court itself. What distin-
guishes the Justices as a group from other federal judges is not so 
much their talent as the luck and the political skills that got them 
onto the high court, along with the grandiose aura that accom-
panies their greatly enhanced power. Requiring the Supreme 
Court's work to be done by ordinary judges would make it more 
likely that they would only do the Court's proper work. 
Some might argue that the system would have been defec-
tive in that judges would not have remained to decide the merits 
of most cases for which they had granted certiorari. I count that 
as yet another virtue of Supreme Court riding. Judges would 
have generally granted certiorari without knowing the identity of 
the case's ultimate decision makers. This veil of ignorance 
would discourage strategic behavior, thus strengthening the rule 
of law. 
It is possible that some forms of Supreme Court riding 
could be implemented within the constitutional universe we al-
ready inhabit. The Constitution provides: "The Judges, both of 
the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices, during 
good Behavior. ... "13 The most natural reading may require (and 
the Framers certainly expected) judges to be appointed to a dis-
tinct Supreme Court, but the language is ambiguous. Moreover, 
the early Supreme Court Justices who rode circuit sat as mem-
bers of inferior courts and thus our early traditions suggest that 
the inferior courts and the Supreme Court did not have to pos-
sess completely separate personnel. Even today, retired Justices 
sometimes sit by designation on courts to which they were never 
appointed, as do many district and circuit judges. The Constitu-
tion does, however, contemplate the office of Chief Justice/4 and 
13. U.S. Const., Art. III,§ 1. 
14. Sec U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is 
tried, the Chief Justice shall preside"). 
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it is more likely that a judge must hold this specific appointment 
during "good behavior." 
However far one might go by statute in the direction of my 
proposal, it would have been better for the Constitution to pro-
vide expressly for Supreme Court riding. If statutory Supreme 
Court riding had been adopted and had proved superior to our 
current system in curbing the Supreme Court's nationalizing 
tendencies, interest groups that generally benefit from eviscer-
ating the restraints of federalism would have tried to amend the 
statute. 15 Moreover, the President and a Congress of one party 
might have been tempted to create the position of Supreme 
Court Justice instead of Supreme Court rider to give more 
power to their prospective appointees. Foreclosing the creation 
of Supreme Court Justices through constitutional language 
would therefore have been the wisest course. 
A constitutional provision to carry out circuit riding might 
have read something like this: "The Supreme Court shall be con-
stituted in such a manner as Congress may by law require from 
among the judges of the inferior courts: provided, however, that 
assignments for terms of equal length not exceeding two years 
shall be made randomly from among appellate courts or courts 
of first instance, or both."16 That would have allowed Congress 
to decide important issues whose optimal treatment might 
change over the course of the nation's history, such as whether 
to use only appellate judges as opposed to trial judges, whether 
to have staggered terms, and exactly how long those terms 
should be. On the other hand the requirement of randomness 
would have prevented Congress from manipulating the system to 
obtain the selection of its preferred judges. 
In creating an alternate universe by eliminating an office 
rather than by eliminating a particular event or person, I am 
guided by the spirit of the Framers. The Framers recognized 
that while we can never know the particular problems of the fu-
ture, we can grasp man's enduring nature and invent political 
15. For a discussion of the manner in which interest groups eviscerate sound con· 
stitutional restraints, see John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority 
Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 365,394-96 (1999). 
16. The optimal constitutional provision might well also have permitted Congress 
to choose state supreme court judges on a random basis to ride to the Supreme Court. 
Their service would create yet another force for preserving federalism. The option of 
employing state supreme court judges would also have preserved Congress' option of 
declining to create interior federal courts. See U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1 ("The judicial 
powt:r of the United States shall be v~:sted ... in such interior courts as Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish."). 
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machinery that turns the inputs of that nature and our particular 
environment into the output of good government. In my view, 
Supreme Court riding should have been made part of our consti-
tutional machine because it would have better channeled the 
ambition of our judges into enforcing the rule of law appropriate 
for the limited and decentralized government that the rest of the 
Constitution contemplated. 
